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Barbara A. Bennett*
The FDIC'sfailure to close insolvent institutions before their market-
value net worth becomes negative adds a further sizeable subsidy to
risk-taking. In effect, it grants shareholders a larger (expected) claim
against insured institutions than that represented by recordednet worth.
More stringentenforcementofexisting portfolio regulations by the FDIC,
comparable to restrictive covenants in bond indentures, wouldeliminate
a large portion ofthis subsidy andhelp minimize the agency's losses.
Many have argued for some time that the present
deposit insurance system encourages depository
institutions to take more risks than are optimal for
society. Under the present system, insured institu-
tions are frequently allowed to continue raising
insured deposits even after they have exhausted
their net worth on a market value basis. As a result,
the marginal cost of increased risk-taking from the
perspective of the individual institution is lower
than the cost to society as a whole. Insured institu-
tions, therefore, tend to take on more risk than
society would prefer. Moreover, the recent deregu-
lation of deposit interest rates, the loosening of
restrictions on depository institutions' lending and
investmentpowers and the increase in deposit insur-
ance coverage from $40,000 to $100,000 probably
enhance this tendency to undertake excessive risk.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) and others argue that this potential for in-
creased risk to the deposit insurance fund creates a
need for countervailing reforms that will give de-
*Economist, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francis-
co. Jennifer Eccles provided excellent research
assistance.
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pository institutions incentives to reduce risk-taking
and/or give the insurance agency new powers to
manage the risk to its fund. Much has already been
written about the relative merits of various reform
proposals. This article takes a different approach by
evaluating the FDIC's use of its current regulatory
and supervisory powers. Based on this evaluation,
it is clear that the need for reform would be less
pressing today, even with deregulation, ifthe FDIC
had made better use of its authority to control
risk-taking.
In Section I, the nature of the risk to the deposit
insurance fund is described. Preservation of the
market value of the deposit insurance fund is set
forth as the criterion for judging the FDIC's use of
its current powers to control risk-taking. Section II
compares the FDIC's regulatory and supervisory
powers to restrictive covenants in bond indentures.
Section III evaluates the FDIC's use ofits enforce-
ment powers. Section IV presents and analyzes the
FDIC's options for liquidating insolvent institu-
tions. Although the FDIC's choice of liquidation
proceedings would not affect the (ex ante) risk-
taking behavior of insured institutions, it would
affect the losses incurred by the FDIC and the valueof the insurance fund, which is thought to be a
measure ofthe FDIC's ability to handle widespread
failures. In Section V, the valuation of the deposit
insurance fund is discussed. Finally, the paper con-
cludes with some observations on desirable changes
in the FDIC's behavior.
I. The Risks to the Deposit Insurance Fund
Most analysts do not question whether deposit
insurance in some form is necessary. Neither do
they question the need for some government in-
volvement in the provision of deposit insurance.
The financial panics of the period before the crea-
tion of the FDIC and the relative stability of the
financial system since then provide ample evi-
dence, it seems, for the benefits of govemment-
provided deposit insurance.
Risk-taking Subsidy
The provision of deposit insurance, however,
may encourage insured institutions to take on more
risk than is socially optimal. Deposit insurance
clearly reduces depositors' incentive to monitor the
financial condition of the institutions where they
place their funds. Thus, unless the insurer closes
failing institutions before their net worth (on a mar-
ket value basis) is exhausted, deposit insurance will
give such institutions incentive to take on extraor-
dinary risks with insured deposits, because the costs
(after the institution becomes insolvent) will be
borne solely by the insurer. Moreover, systematic
failure to close insured institutions as they become
insolvent affects the risk-taking behavior not only
ofthose institutions on the verge ofinsolvency, but
that ofall insured institutions.
A tendency to close failing institutions only after
their net worth becomes negative will distort the
marginal cost ofrisk-taking by reducing the cost of
increased leverage. Shareholders of an insured in-
stitution would be willing in such cases to accept
greater leverage for a given level of portfolio risk
and return· because the expected value of their
claims against the institution will be greater than
thatrepresented by its recordednet worth (evenona
market value basis). This is because, in the event
that the institution fails and is found to have nega-
tive net worth, the burden falls on the insurerrather
than on the shareholders. As a result, the cost of
raising additional equity will not reflect the true
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social cost of increased risk-taking, and insured
institutions will tend to take on more risk and operate
with greaterleverage than they would otherwise.
Bank Closure Rule
To eliminate this subsidy to risk-taking, all the
insurer need do is guarantee that, on average, in-
sured institutions are closed as their net worth
becomes negative. Under such a rule, the expected
cost ofincreased risk-taking would be borue entire-
ly by the shareholders I of insured institutions.
They, in turn, would demand a premium commen-
surate with those risks, including risks associated
with high leverage. As a result, insured institutions
would have an incentive to reduce risk-taking and
leverage to socially desired levels.
This closure rule implies, of course, that the
protection afforded depositors is not insurance as
the term is generally understood. Instead, the gov-
ernment in effect provides a guarantee that an
"insured" institution will always have sufficient
assets (on a market value basis) to discharge its
liabilities, or that institution would not be allowed
to stay in business. Theoretically, under such a rule,
neither the depositors nor the insurer need ever
incur losses, making a deposit insurance fund
unnecessary.
The task of closing insured institutions before
their net worth becomes negative is not a simple
one, however. Determining when insolvency oc-
curs is subjective, particularly under book value
accounting conventions. In most cases, bank failure
occurs not as a result ofa readily observable inabil-
ity to meet maturing obligations, but as a result of
the more subjective determinationthat the value of
the bank's loan and/or investment portfolio has
deteriorated sufficiently to wipe out its capital. This
determination is subjective because, short of a
decision to close the bank and sell off its assets,
there is no way objectively to determine the market
value of the bank's portfolio. The other, moreobjective, liquidity standard for detennining a
firm's bankruptcy (a firm's inability to meet matur-
ing obligations) is one which the courts have ap-
plied to nonbanking firms. It is generally not appli-
cable to banks and other depository institutions
because, as noted above, deposit insurance has, to a
large degree, removed depositors' incentive to
withdraw funds when abank is in dangeroffailing.
To make matters worse, the FDIC does not have
the legal authority to close a bank that, by the
FDIC's valuation, is insolvent. Instead, the bank's
chartering authority (that is, the Comptroller ofthe
Currency in the case of a national bank, or the
appropriate state banking agency in the case of a
state-chartered bank) must determine that a bank is
insolvent and close it before the FDIC can take
action to limit its losses. This division of responsi-
bilities can create problems for the control ofrisk to
the deposit insurance fund. Not having the insur-
ance liability of the FDIC, the other regulators'
concern for the viability ofthe banks they supervise
may lead them to keep a bank open longer than is
optimal (that is, long enough to be certain that
capital has been exhausted, which, because of un-
certainties regarding asset valuation, is usually after
capital has actually been exhausted).
As aresult, the timing ofbankclosures is likely to
be biased in favor ofallowing insolvent institutions
to continue in operation. In fact, given the uncer-
tainties associated with bank asset valuation, there
will almost certainly be a bias toward closing in-
sured institutions after their net worth becomes
negative. This holds unless there are also legal
guidelines permitting regulators to close institutions
when net worth is still positive. Such guidelines
would allow the average value of net worth at the
time ofclosure to be zero, and avoid the subsidy to
increased risk-taking.
One measure ofthe extentofthis bias, and ofthe
resulting subsidy to risk-taking, is the amountofthe
FDIC's net losses in connection with bank failures.
Because the failure to close insolvent institutions
represents, in effect, a guaranteeofsolvency onthe
part of the FDIC, the FDIC's potential liability
increases in direct proportion to the amount of
negative net worth in insured institutions. As a
result, the FDIC's losses are also closely related to
the amount by which insured institutions' net worth
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is allowed to become negative on a market value
basis. (By the same token, if insured institutions
were closed before net worth became negative, the
FDIC's potential liability would be zero and the
agency would not incur losses since the value of
failing institutions' assets would, by definition, be
sufficient to discharge depositors' and other credi-
tors' claims.) The FDIC's net losses between 1934
and 1983 amounted to $2.4 billion, of which $2.2
billion represented losses incurred since 1980 (pri-
marily in connection with mutual savings bank fail-
ures. See Table I). These figures probably provide
only a lower-bound estimate ofthe size ofthe sub-
sidy to risk-taking since they reflect the negative net
worth position of only the institutions that were
finally closed. Nonetheless, $2.2 billion over a
three-year period constitutes a sizeable subsidy.
Bank Closure Authority
Given the magnitude ofthe subsidy arising from
the failure to close insolvent institutions promptly,
the FDIC needs the authority to close such institu-
tions. But until such authority is granted, the FDIC
needs to exert greater pressure on the chartering
agencies to close insolvent institutions. Since the
chartering agencies generally consult the FDIC
whenever an insured institution is considered in
danger of failing, the FDIC clearly has an oppor-
tunity to make its views known. The FDIC was, in
fact, consulted about the majority of the bank fail-
ures to date, yet its losses amounted to $2.4 billion.
Thus, one would be hard-pressed to conclude that
the FDIC has sought to minimize its subsidy to
risk-taking.
Two examples of the FDIC's reluctance to seek
an earlier closure of insolvent institutions will suf-
fice. In the recent failures of the United American
Bank of Knoxville, Tennessee, and affiliated
banks, the FDIC was aware ofthe condition ofthe
banks for some time before they were declared
insolvent, yet the FDIC apparently made no attempt
to encourage the state-banking agency to close the
banks sooner. Losses to the insurance fund from
these failures are likely to run as high as $220
million. Likewise, in the case of the Franklin Na-
tional Bank failure in 1974, the FDIC acquiesced in
the decision to keep the bank open for a period of
several months until a purchaser was found, TheFDIC's liability mounted during that time because,
as the uninsured creditors took the opportunity to
withdraw their funds, the bank replaced them with
borrowings from the Federal Reserve, which the
FDIC agreed to repay. If the agency had recorded
foregone interest as a cost of this transaction, its
losses would have been sizeable.
Efforts to close insolvent institutions sooner than
is presently the case, however, will not eliminate
the subsidy to risk-taking completely because there
will always be instances in which failure is not
detected immediately. For example, failure may
occur between examinations. Thus, although the
FDIC could reduce this subsidy substantially by
pressing chartering agencies to close insolvent insti-
tutions sooner, some form ofmore direct control is
also necessary. Two approaches (separately or in
combination) are available: risk-adjusted pricing of
deposit insurance and/or regulation of bank port-
folios. Since the FDIC must currently charge in-
sured institutions the same statutory assessmentrate
for deposit insurance regardless of riskiness, the
task of reducing risk-taking falls largely on super-
vision and regulation. While such an approach may
seem, at first glance, less efficient than pricing,
private long-term debt markets use such an ap-
proach in addition to risk-pricing to control the risks
that private firms might take.
The appropriate criterion for judging the effec-
tiveness of the FDIC's supervisory and regulatory
powers, then, is the extent to which those powers
give the FDIC the ability to protect the marketvalue
of the deposit insurance fund. The next section
evaluates the FDIC's regulatory and supervisory
powers in comparison to the mechanisms private
markets have developed for protecting the principal
value ofinvestors' funds.
Table 1
FDIC Insurance Losses By Year
(dollars are in millions)
Liquidation Status
Year All Cases Payoff Cases Assumption Cases
Number Losses Number Losses Number Losses
1965 5 $--:3.9 $I8 $ 0.1
1966 7 0.5 I 6 0.5
1967 4 1.0 4 1.0
1968 3 0.01 3 0.01
1969 9 0.1 4 0.1 5
1970 7 0.3 4 0.3 3 0.01
1971 6 0.2 5 0.2 I
1972 I 1.2 I 1.2
1973 6 67.6 3 3 67.6
1974 4 0.3 4 0.3
1975 13 18.7 3 0.1 10 18.6
1976 16 22.5 3 1.9 13 20.6
1977 6 1.2 6 1.2
1978 7 5.9 I 01 6 5.8
1979 10 7.8 3 0.7 7 7.1
1980 10 21.0 3 1.8 7 19.2
1981 10 556.7 2 1.2 8 555.5
1982 42 1,069.1 7 48.0 35 1,021.1
1983 584;9 9 18.3 39 566.6
---.,,~"'~--~ ---~--
-"'-~-,- ..'" ..._-- _ ....,---
Total
1934-1983 668 $2,393.4 328 $96.2 340 $2,297.1
Source: FDIC, AnnualReport 1982, p. 38 (Figures for 1983 were obtained from FDIC staff)
19Regulatory Means
In the same way that restrictive covenants protect
bondholders, regulations regarding, among other
things, loan concentrations, insider transactions
and capital adequacy standards can protect the de-
posit insurance fund by constraining banks' invest-
ment and financing choices. The most significant
check on the actions of a bank's shareholders, of
course, is the enforcementofcapital adequacy stan-
dards. The FDIC has stated that it will enforce a
minimum capital-to-total assets ratio offive percent
for the banks it insures, and that the adequacy of a
bank's capital structure will be evaluated in lightof
the riskiness of the bank's portfolio.
6 Capital in-
cludes reported equity capital, reserves (including
loan loss reserves) and mandatory convertible sub-
ordinated debt-net of loans the FDIC has classi-
fied as having a high probability of default. This
U. Restrictive Covenants As a Paradigm for Bank Supervision
dend policy. By specifying the percentage of the
pool ofcurrent and retained earnings and new stock
issues that is available for dividends, redemptions
and repurchases, this type ofcovenant prevents the
firm's owners from reducing investment (and there-
fore, the value ofoutstanding debt) to increase share
values.
A second class of covenants found in long-term
debt contracts covers actions by a firm's sharehold-
ers that would tend to dilute the claims of bond-
holders. For example, covenants of this sort may
require that a firm maintain certain financial ratios
such as capitalization to debt and short-term assets
to short-term debt at pre-specified levels as a condi-
tion ofissuing additional debt. There are also likely
to be restrictions on the issuance ofdebt with claims
senior to those ofthe outstanding debt.
Finally, while covenants are not generally written
to constrain a firm's investment choices directly
(because of prohibitive enforcement costs), many
have that effect. Constraints placedondividend and
financing policy will also constrain investment
policy by limiting the firm's cash flow. Moreover,
restrictions on the disposition of assets and the ac-
quisition of claims against other firms make the
pursuit of a more risky investment policy more
difficult.
Like deposit insurance, the existence of long-
term debt can influence shareholders' incentives to
undertake risk. Because long-term creditors cannot
simply withdraw their funds as the condition of a
firm worsens, the existence of long-term debt pro-
vides an opportunity for the firm to continue operat-
ing with negative net worth on a market value basis.
To prevent the shareholders from engaging in acti-
vities that are riskier than what the bondholders
would prefer, long-term debt markets have sought
to control shareholders' behavior not only through
pricing but through restrictive covenants. Thus, a
model for evaluating the powers ofthe FDIC is the
extent to which they take on the characteristics of
bond covenants. 3
Long-term debtholders have long recognized the
potential for conflict between their interests and
those of the issuing firm's shareholders. To the
extentthat investors can anticipate the future invest-
ment opportunities and risk characteristics of a
given firm, the prices ofthat firm's equity and debt
will incorporate risk permiums commensurate with
the marginal cost to society as a whole. In theory,
pricing could even incorporate a premium to com-
pensate investors for the possibility that the issuing
firm would be able to operate until the entire value
of the long term debt had been exhausted. (The
price of the firm's equity would be higher and the
price ofthe firm's debt would be lower than other-
wise.) However, investors might then require such a
high premium for holding bonds that no market for
long-term debt woulddevelop. Consequently, long-
term debt contracts also contain covenants that con-
strain the shareholders' ability to engage in activi-
ties that would place bondholders at such a risk.
4
These covenants generally place restrictions on the
issuing firm's dividend, financing and/or invest-
ment policies. Violationsofsuch covenants give the
bondholders the right to re-negotiate the terms of
the indenture or even to declare the firm in default
and seize collateral oraccelerate the maturity ofthe
debt, frequently forcing the firm into bankruptcy.
5
One type of covenant common to many debt
contracts places restrictions on the ability of the
firm's management to reduce the value ofthe firm's
debtcoverage through stock repurchase and/ordivi-
20policy, together with the FDIC'sauthority to ordera
bank to stop paying dividends undercertaincircum-
stances, serves to protect the insurance fund from
shareholders' policies that are contrary to the
FDIC's interest.
By enforcing a minimum capital standard, the
FDIC is effectively placing restrictions on a bank's
ability to reduce coverage (protection) for the de-
posit insurance fund. Bond covenants restricting a
firm's dividend policy serve the same purpose.
Moreover, a minimum capital standard limits the
extent to which a bank can issue more deposits and
thereby increase the size of the FDIC's liability
without also increasing the size o(thebank'scapital
base. Finally, the FDIC's policy on bank capital
significantly constrains a bank's ability to follow
risky lending and investment policies. By requiring
banks to subtract from their capital base the (book)
value ofloans with a high probability ofdefault, the
FDIC is able to force shareholders to absorb more of
the costs of risky lending policies. Likewise, by
stating that it will establish highercapital standards
for riskierbanks, the FDIC is again requiring share-
holders to absorb the costs ofincreased risk-taking.
Additional restrictions onbanks' ability to pursue
risky policies include various regulations limiting
both concentrations ofloans to any given borrower
and transactions between a bank and its executive
officers, directors orprincipal shareholders. More-
over, regulations regarding debt issuance and
pledgedassets constrain abank'sability todilutethe
claims ofthe insurance fund. Like bond covenants
restricting a firm's ability to issue new debt with
claims senior to those ofexisting debtholders, pro-
hibitions against preferred debt in a bank's capital
structure prevent some forms of claim dilution.
Likewise, the ruling that only the uninsured depos-
its of public units may be secured by a pledge of
assets places acheckon banks' ability to undermine
the FDIC's claim on their assets in case ofinsolven-
cy. Finally, like many bond contracts, bank regula-
tors require that banks have an adequate system of
internal audits and that they purchase insurance to
protect against certain types of risk, such as theft,
fraud and employee infidelity. These requirements
provide a buffer for the deposit insurance fund,
particularly since many bank failures have involved
fraud orinsider abuses.
Clearly, then, bank regulation has much in
common with restrictive bond covenants that are
designed to control shareholders' tendencies to
maximize their share values at the expense of the
bondholders (or the deposit insurance fund). And,
like bondholders, bank regulators have substantial
powers to enforce these regulations. The next sec-
tion evaluates the FDIC's use ofthese powers.
III. EnforcementOptions
Although the FDIC insures the deposits ofnearly
all banks in the U.S., it can take direct enforcement
action only against the state-chartered nonmember
banks.
7 Thus, the FDIC regulates and supervises
directly only 59 percent of the more that 14,000
insuredbanks (andonly about23 percentofthe total
banking assets) in this country. While the other
federal regulators have substantially the same
powersoverthe remaining institutions, this division
of authority could increase the risk to the deposit
insurance fund because the other regulators might
perceive risk differently from the FDIC. To reduce
the risks arising from this division of powers, the
FDIC is seeking legislation to give it the full range
of enforcement powers over the banks it does not
supervise directly.8 However, its record as super-
visorofbanks overwhich it does have directauthor-
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ity suggests that even ifgranted expanded powers,
the FDIC is not likely to enforce regulations much
more vigorously than the otherregulators.
On the whole, the FDIC has tended to make
limited use ofits current enforcement powers, par-
ticularly those involving legal proceedings, despite
the substantial increase in risks to the insurance
fund (as measured by the substantial lossesincurred
by the FDIC) over the last several years. Thus,
although the FDIC has the authority to thwart in-
sured nonmember banks' expansion. plans, issue
cease-and-desist orders, impose civil money penal-
ties, suspend/remove bank officers and directors
and ultimately terminate the insurance of any in-
sured bank, it has tended to rely mainly on informal
agreements with offending institutions and on more
frequent examinations of their portfolios. Of1. Large banks are those with total assets in excess of $300
million.
2. Data by size ofinstitution were not available until 1976.
Source: FDIC. AssetsandLiabilitiesofCommercialandMutual
Savings Banks.
the FDIC would have been significal1tly more strin-
gent in regulating these banks' capital in any case.
For example, in the United American Bankfailure,
the FDIC did have direct supervisory authority but
nevertheless permittedthe bank to continueexpand-
ing its branch network even afterthe bankhad been
deemed in danger of failing. 10 (As mentioned ear-
lier, the bank and its affiliated banks failed in Feb-
ruary 1983.)
Legal Proceedings
The FDIC also has the ability to threaten and
initiate legal proceedings (including termination of
deposit insurance) against a bank. However, be-
cause ofthe costs (administrative hearings, for ex-
ample) and delays involved in imposing these legal
sanctions, the FDIC generally does not resort to
them except in the most extreme cases. Until 1966,
termination was the only legal proceedingthe FDIC
could bring against a bank, and it remains the only
legal proceeding the FDIC can bring against the
banks it does not supervise directly. Between 1966
and 1983, the FDIC initiated an average ofonly six
Table 2
Captial Trends In Insured Banks


















































As a first step in inducing a nonmember bankto
change its behavior, the FDIC always attempts to
obtain some agreement from the bank to rectify the
situation (including a plan to increase capital), The
FDIC also increases the frequency ofexamination
to monitor the bank's efforts at changing its prac-
tices. Such actions impose the burden of a signifi-
cantcoston the bank, comparable, in some ways, to
an increase in the insurance premium rate. Thus,
like bond covenants that give bondholders the right
to force the issuing firm to renegotiate the terms of
the original contract when it has violated one or
more of its provisions, the FDIC's ability to in-
crease the frequency of examinations enables the
agency to "renegotiate" the terms of the deposit
insurance "contract" to reflect the increase in risk
assumed by the fund.
Should agreements and more frequent examina-
tions prove ineffective, the FDIC may decide to
deny a nonmember bank's application to expandits
activities. The FDIC has stated that it will use its
authority to deny branch and acquisition applica-
tions, for example, as a means offorcing a bank to
improve a seriously impaired capital structure.
9
This power is analogous to bond covenants that
prevent a firm from undertaking certain types of
activities until pre-specified minimum levels of
capitalization and working capital, forexample,are
met. However, the FDIC has been criticized for not
making greater use of this authority. The agency,
together with the other bank regulatots,allowed
bank capital ratios to decline throughoutthe.1970s
and early 1980s-at a time when most observers
would argue that the more uncertain economic cli-
mate called for higher capital ratiOs. Thisdeclirie
has been especially pronounced at the large baI1ks,
where capital fell below 5 percentofassets between
1978 and 1981 (See Table 2.) Ofcourse, a sizeable
proportion of these large banks are not supervised
directly by the FDIC. However, it is notclear that
course, these last two actions are frequently suffi-
cient to induce an insured institution to change its
behavior. Nevertheless, the FDIC's apparentreluc-
tance to resort to more serious measures until insti-
tutions are on the verge ofinsolvency unnecessarily
increases the risk to the insurance fund.
22termination proceedings a year-far below the
annual average of 284 banks that were considered
problem institutions overthat sameperiod. Since its
inception, the FDIC has initiated only 307 termina-
tion proceedings even though the number ofbanks
operating with negative net worth has undoubtedly
exceededthe number(668) that actually failed. This
reluctance to resort to termination proceedings is
particularly significant since termination ofdeposit
insurance is tantamount to a declaration of insol-
vency. A greater willingness to terminate·would
help overcome the FDIC's present lack ofauthority
to close insolvent institutions.
Other Enforcement Measures
In 1966 the agency was granted authority to issue
cease-and-desistorders. Again, however, the FDIC
has tended not to use this power except in cases of
serious multiple infractions such as insider abuses,
unsafe lending practices and/or serious impairment
of capital. Between 1966 and 1975, only 37 such
orders were issued. Since then, the agency has
made greater use of this authority, issuing an aver-
age ofmore than 40 a year. Nonetheless, the FDIC
still tends to use cease-and-desist only after the
condition of a bank has deteriorated to the point
where it represents a substantial risk to the insur-
ance fund. Since cease-and-desist powers were
granted to give the FDIC a more flexible weapon
than termination proceedings, the reluctance to use
these powers unnecessarily hampers the FDIC's
efforts to reduce bank risk-taking.
The FDIC's authority to impose civil money pen-
alties, granted in 1978, has been used very infre-
quently. Only 11 were issued in 1982 and only three
in the preceding years. In general, the FDIC uses
this authority only after a bank has violated a cease-
and-desist order, even though it has the authority to
impose penalties for violations of laws limiting
dealings with bank officials and/or corporate affili-
ates ofthe bank. Finally, the substantial restrictions
on the exercise of the FDIC's authority to suspend
or remove bank officers and directors mean that the
FDIC has made limiteduse ofthisauthority as well.
Thus, although the FDIC has considerable auth-
ority to take actions against a bank that poses a
substantial riskto the insurance fund, such authority
is used infrequently. In the end, this reluctance
increases the losses borne by the FDIC and raises
the value ofthe subsidy to bank risk-taking.
IV. Insolvency Proceedings
Once an insolventinstitution is finally closed, the
means by which the FDIC disposes of that institu-
tion may affect the size of the FDIC's reported
losses to some extent, but it will not affect the (ex
ante) risk-taking behavior of insured institutions
further (with one exception as noted below). How-
ever, because unnecessary losses impose additional
costs on society by diminishing the FDIC's resour-
ces to handle future failures (the agency may be
forced to raise effective assessment rates or, in the
case ofwidespread failure, seek assistance from the
Treasury orthe Federal Reserve System), minimiz-
ing actual losses associated with bank failures even
after banks fail may be as important a social goal
as minimizing potential losses before·banks fail.
Therefore, this section examines the FDIC's op-
tions for disposing ofinsolvent institutions.
As the receiver", the FDIC has several options
for liquidating the assets of and paying off the
claims against a failed bank. First, itcan payoffthe
bank's depositors up to the insurance maximum of
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$100,000. Second, it can arrange for another insti-
tution to purchase the assets and assume the liabili-
ties-Purchase and Assumption (P&A)-of the
failed bank. Third, it can arrange afinancially assis-
ted mergerwhich is, in many respects, equivalent to
a P&A. Orfourth, ifit decides thatclosing the bank
is not the best approach, it can make loans or pro-
vide otherfinancial assistance to the bank to keep it
open. The FDIC's choice among these options de-
pends primarily onwhich, in each case, involves
the least cost to the FDIC (on the basis of initial
estimates). However, these costs are estimated on
the basis of accounting costs and may not give
appropriate consideration to the effects ofthe trans-
action onthe market value ofthe fund. As a result,
the FDIC's choice may at times reduce the value of
the fund unnecessarily.
Deposit Payoff
In a deposit payoff, the FDIC literally pays a
bank's depositors the value of their claims againstthe bank up to the insurance maximum. Theagency
may choose to make the payments directly or, as it
has done in a handful of cases, pay depositors
through a Deposit Insurance National Bank(DINB)
which it is authorized to operate for upto twoyears.
In either case, by paying off the depositors,. the
FDIC assumes the depositors' claims and becomes
a general creditor of the failed bank. Then, as re-
ceiver, the FDIC sells the asset'> of the bank and
distributes the proceeds to the bank's creditors,
including the insurance fund and the uninsured de-
positors, according to the legal priority ofthe claim
and in proportion to the relative sizeofthe claim.If
the value of the assets is insufficient to cover the
value of the liabilities, the FDIC as well as every
other creditor (with the possible exception of pre-
ferred creditors or those with secured claims) re-
ceive only a portion ofthe value oftheirclaims.
However, the FDIC, as receiver, cantake certain
steps to reduce the size ofthe losses incurred bythe
failed bank's creditors in a deposit payoffcase. To
the extent that the bank has insured depositors who
also have delinquent loans outstanding at the bank,
the FDIC can reduce its insurance liability and the
losses incurred by the other creditors by offsetting
the (book) value ofthe loan against the parvalue of
the insured deposit. Ifthe FDIC were to payoffthe
full value ofthe deposit and sell the delinquentloan,
the receivership would incur a loss equal to the
difference between the book and market values of
the delinquent loan. In effect, the loan offset policy
transfers this loss from the general creditors ofthe
failed bank to the borrower/depositor.
At the same time that the FDIC uses adelinquent-
loan offset policy to reduce its liability and to pro·
teet the insurance fund, curiously, it also offers
uninsured depositors a "sound"-loan offset which
increases its liability. In essence, depositors.are
allowed to use the book value oftheir indebtedness
to the failed bank as an offset against the par value
of their uninsured deposit to increase their deposit
insurance protection. A depositor with a $50,000
loan from the bank and a deposit of$140,000,for
example, wouldfind thisoffsetpolicyinherinterest
because, by using the deposit to discharge the in-
debtedness, the remaining deposit would be
$90,OOO-which is fully insured. Withouttheloan
offset, she would receive protection for only
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$100,000ofherdepositandher$50,000loanliabil-
ity would remain. With a good credit rating, the
borrower/depositor would presumably have no
trouble refinancing her loan and, as a result of the
loan offset, will have protected herself against a
possible loss on the uninsured portion of the
deposit.
The FDIC has chosen to offer depositors this
option because it enables the agency to reduce the
size ofits initial cash outlay. In the example above,
the FDIC would have paid $100,000 without the
offset, but only $90,000 with the offset. This em-
phasis on cash outlay is misplaced in this case,
however. Thepolicy will likely increasethe FDIC's
losses because, by allowing depositors to wipe out
their indebtedness to the bank, the FDICis reducing
the aggregate value of the receivership's assets by
more than it is reducing the valueofits claims onthe
receivership's assets. In the example above, the
assets ofthe receivership were reducedby $50,000,
while the FDIC's claim was reduced by only
$10,000. In effect, the FDIC is allowing other gen-
eral creditors (that is, uninsured depositors) to assert
theirclaims against the bankaheadofits own claims.
To the extent that the receivership incurs losses,
then, the FDIC will bear a larger share ofthem.
The FDIC has used the deposit payoff approach
in 328 of the 668 failed bank cases between 1934
and 1983. With the notable exception of Penn
Square National Bank in 1982, the banks whose
deposits have been paid offby the FDIC have been
small- holding an average of$3.4 million in total
deposits. The FDIC chose to payoff these banks
because high-cost liabilities, undesirable markets
and/orlimitations on intra-and interstate branching,
among otherthings, made them relatively unattrac-
tive to potential bidders. Moreover, in some ofthe
cases, particularly that of Penn Square, the exis·
tence oflarge contingent claims against the bankor
the suspicion offraud made the FDIC's costs under
a purchase and assumption transaction potentially
quite large, causing the agency to opt for the high,
but more certain, costs ofa payoff.
Purchase and Assumption
Of the remaining 340 insured bank· failures
between 1934 and 1983, the FDIC arranged P&As
for the overwhelming majority. The P&A approachis clearly preferred by the agency for dealing with
the failure ofIarge banks. In fact, untilthe failure of
Penn Square, which was paid off for the special
reasons already noted, any bank with even $100
million in deposits was always disposed ofthrough
a purchase and assumption or a comparable finan-
cially assisted merger. The P&A is preferred be-
cause it is less disruptive than the payoff approach
and has apparent cost advantages. In a deposit pay-
off, thebank'sbusiness is liquidated and the going-
concern value is lost. In a P&A, by contrast, the
winning bidder acquires the failed bank's business
and paysa premium for it, offsettingaportionofthe
FDIC's costs. For large banks, in particular, this
premium, whichreflects the acquiring bank's valu-
ation of the "goodwill" inherent in the failed
bank's branch network and customer relationships,
among otherthings, is generally sufficientto reduce
the estimated cost of the P&A below that of the
payoff. Moreover, the authority given to the FDIC
by the Garn-StGermain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982 to arrange interstate and interindustry pur-
chases should increase these premiums because the
FDIC will be able to sell multi-state charters that are
not otherwise legally permissible.
In its simplest form, the purchase and assumption
transaction requires that the acquiring institution
assume all the deposit liabilities 12 and most other
nonsubordinated liabilities ofthe failed bank. With
these liabilities, it acquires''clean" assets ofequiv-
alent value-typically, the failed bank's premises
(at appraised value), the securities portfolio(marked-
to-market) and the performing loans (at book value),
plus cash from the FDIC (less the amount of the
purchase premium) to make. up the difference.be-
tween the values of the liabilities assumed and the
assets acquired. Finally, becausethe acquiring bank
does nofassumeall the failedbank's liabilities, the
FDIC agreestoidemnify itagainst any costs arising
fromclaimsit does not explicitly assume.
The accounting originofthe FDIC's cash outlay
is eithera loan (at below~marketrates) by the FDIC
tothereceivershipsecuredbytheremaining,unac-
ceptable assets (at bookvalue), or an outright pur-
chase ofthose assets (at book value). Then, as the
FDICliquidates the assets it has acquired, itdistri-
butes the proceedsamong theremaining claimhold-
ers according to the priority of their claims and in
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proportion to the size of their claims. Thus, to the
extent that the FDICcaneither sell the nonperform-
ing loans at some price orforce delinquentborrowers
to pay offtheir indebtedness, the FDIC willrecover
a portion ofits cash outlay.
By preserving the going-concern value of the
failed bank, the FDIC has been able to use the P&A
to reduce its recorded costs. However, because the
use of the P&A provides, in effect, 100 percent
insurance coverage to all depositors (including
those with deposits in excess of $100,000) and
many other uninsured creditors 13 , as well, this ap-
proach increases the FDIC's liability unnecessarily
and probably results in an understatementofthe true
costs of the transaction for two reasons. First, the
FDIC is removing a source ofmarket discipline on
the risk-taking proclivities of all insured banks.
Thus, the FDIC has greatly increased its potential
liability by increasing the likelihood that insured
institutions will engage in excessive risk-taking. As
a result, the effectofthis transaction onthe value of
the deposit insurance fund is seriously understated.
Second, while other general creditors are made
whole immediately, the FDIC is repaid only as it
sells the poor quality assets that were not assumed
by the acquiring institution. These assets are likely
to require extraordinary expenses to be made mar-
ketable, and the FDIC's initial estimates ofthe cost
ofthe P&A may not adequately take these expenses
into account. Moreover, only the FDIC and subor-
dinated creditors remain to bear these expenses.
(For example, in one case, the FDIC had to invest
an additional $1 million in a real estatedevelopment
it had acquired before it could sell the develop-
ment. 14) Although the purchase premium may off-
set a portion ofthese expenses, in many cases, the
premium is not sufficient to provide a full offset
(that is, the net worth of the failed bank is still
negative when its goodwill is included). Therefore,
the FDIC could reduce its losses significantly by
sharing these costs with uninsured depositors and
othergeneral creditors. Recent P&Atransactions in
which only the insured deposits ofthe failed bank
have been assumed by the acquiring institutionsug~
gestthat the FDIC may be moving in this direction.
Thus, partofthe attractiveness oftheP&A, from
the FDIC'sperspective, may result from tendencies
to understate the full cost ofthe transaction. IftheFDIC had accounted for these transactions on a
market-value basis, the P&A (as it has beenadmin-
istered) might not have been the preferredoption in
as many cases, despite the loss of going-concern
value under a deposit payoff. This may be.particu-
larly true when uninsured deposits represented
more than a miniscule proportionoftotal liabilities.
Financially Assisted Mergers
A few ofthe more than 300transactions the FDIC
counts as P&As were actually financially assisted
mergers (FAMs). Most of these involved large
mutual savingsbankfailures-12 occurredbetween
1981 and early 1983. The FDIC counts these as
P&As because, while they differ from P&As in a
number of technical respects, their impact on the
liability ofthe FDIC is comparable to that ofP&As.
The decision to use a merger instead ofa P&A for
failing mutual savings banks is based largely onthe
distinguishing characteristics of mutual savings
banks and not on the relative costs to the FDIC ofa
merger and a P&A.
Unlike commercialbanks, mutuals' problems are
due primarily to interest rate risk. The combination
of a duration mismatch between their long assets
and short liabilities and the upward trend in interest
rates since the mid-1970s steadily eroded the indus-
try's reported net worth. On a market value basis,
the erosion was dramatic: by 1980, the value ofthe
industry's assets had declined so much that it was
substantially insolvent.
Given this erosion in the market value of a mu-
tual's entire portfolio, the practiceofdividing assets
into "acceptable" and "unacceptable" categories
does not make sense. Instead, in its handling of
failing mutuals, the FDIC undertakes to keep the
institution open until itcan, by providing someform
of financial assistance, arrange a mergerwithia
stronger institution. In the typical FAM (although
the specificsofeach transaction vary considerably),
the acquiring institution accepts a large portion of
the failing institution's assets (generally at book
value) and most of the liabilities as well.Italso
obtains the goodwill ofthe failed institution. Then,
because the market value ofthe acquired liabilities
exceeds that of the acquired assets, the FDIC pro-
vides the acquiring institution with sufficient finan-
cial assistance to make up the difference.
26
This assistance can take several forms. First, the
FDIC can make a cash loan to the acquiring institu-
tion at a rate below the appropriate risk-adjusted
rate. The FDIC's losses in this case will be in the
form of foregone interest. Second, the FDIC can
purchase some of the assets of the failing bank at
theirbook values. Forexample, in the FDIC'shand-
ling ofthe mergerofGreenwich Savings Bank with
Metropolitan Savings Bank, the FDIC assumed
responsibility for repaying a$428 million loanfrom
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and re-
ceived in return approximately $480 million (book
value) of Greenwich's assets which were actually
worth about half their book value. The FDIC's
losses under this form ofassistance are equal to the
difference between the value ofthe cash outlay (or
liability assumed) and the market value ofthe assets
acquired.
On the FDIC's books, this transaction would
appear as an increase in the FDIC's assets equal to
the book value of the assets assumed and either an
increase in liabilities equal to the liability assumed
or a decrease in cash assets equal to the net cash
outlay. The difference between the book and market
values ofthe assets acquired would be recorded as a
loss which reduces the FDIC's net worth (thatis, the
insurance fund). Thus, this approach should pro-
vide an accurate accounting ofthe true cost, assum-
ing the FDIC can arrive at a close estimate of the
market value ofthe acquired assets. As in the case
of P&As, however, the same problems with esti-
mating extraordinary expenses incurred in dispos-
ing of acquired assets arise, making the FDIC's
valuation ofthis type oftransaction suspect.
The third approach, which the FDIC has chosen
in nine of the 12 recent assisted mergers, may un-
derstate significantly the true costofhandling insol-
vent mutuals. Underthis approach, the FDICenters
into an income maintenance agreement with the
acquiring institution. It agrees to pay thedifference
between the average cost of funds for all mutual
savings banks and the yield on the acquired earning
assets over some period of years. Presumably,the
acquiring bank is willing to pay a higher purchase
"price" in a transaction involving an income
maintenance agreement than in those involving a
subsidizedloan orapurchaseofassets becausesuchan agreement transfers all interest rate risk to the
FDIC.
The FDIC's potential losses, however, are also
much higher. In effect, the FDIC is betting that
interest rates will not rise significantly-the same
thing that got the mutuals into trouble in the first
place. Moreover, it is likely that the FDIC is not
being fully compensated for these increased risks.
Unless the bidding is fully competitive (that is, the
investor who would be willing to pay the highest
premium for the income maintenance agreement
has the opportunity to bidfor the failing institution),
the FDIC's preference for income maintenance
agreements may not take into consideration their
full economic costs. As a result, this practice under-
states the full impact ofthe transaction on the value
ofthe insurance fund.
Financial Assistance to On-Going Banks
In addition to its powers in receivershipcases, the
FDIC has authority to provide financial assistance
to an institution in danger offailing to keep it from
failing. Such authority has serious implications for
the control ofrisk-taking by insured institutions. To
the extent that the FDIC is perceived as being will-
ing to use this authority, insured institutions will
have even greater incentive to take on risks because
the FDIC assistanceenables insolventinstitutions to
continue in operation even longer. Fortunately, the
original legislation granting the FDIC this authority
in 1950 limited its use to situations in which the
FDIC determined that the continued operation of
the bank was essential to its community.
The FDIC has madeextremelylimiteduse (atotal
of five failing bank cases have ben resolved this
way) of this power not only because the agency
tended initially to interpret the enabling legislation
narrowly, but also because amore extensive use of
suchpowers might be viewed as a usurpation ofthe
Federal Reserve's lender-of-Iast-resort function.
With the passage of the Gam-St Germain Act in
1982, however, the FDIC's authority in this regard
was expanded to include nearly all failing bank
cases. To date, the FDIC has not made use of its
expanded authority. However, should the agency
evermake use ofthis expanded power, itmust, as a
condition of providing such assistance, demand
covenants that enable it to exercise substantial con-
trol overthe operations ofthe recipient.
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The FDIC's willingness to impose such condi-
tions is clear from the assistance it provided First
Pennsylvania National Bank in 1980. In this case,
the assistance package feU undertheessentialitytest
implicit in the original (1950) legislation. The FDIC
found that the continued existence ofthe bank was
essential to its community because its size was
such thatfailure might precipitate a crisis ofconfi-
dence in the banking system more generally. Had
First Pennsylvania, with almost $8 billion in assets,
been allowed to fail, it would have been the largest
bank failure in the United States. Instead, the FDIC
put together a $500 million term loan package com-
prising $325 million from the FDIC and $175 mil-
lion from a consortium ofotherbanks. In exchange
for providing an interest rate subsidy on the pack-
age, the FDIC received warrants to purchase 13
million shares ofthe holding company's stock at $3
pershare. The terms ofthe agreement also enabled
the FDIC to place restrictions on the bank's divi-
dend policy and to review the bank's financial plans
periodically. In effect, the FDIC became a share-
holder in the bank with the right, appropriately, to
participate in the potential rewards associated with
the increased risk it was assuming.
At the same time that the Gam-St Germain Act
increased the FDIC's authority to give financial
assistance to weak institutions, it also gave the
agency the authority to prop up the net worth of
mutual savings banks and other qualifying institu-
tions through a net worth certificate program. The
FDIC buys the net worth certificates ofparticipating
institutions (which can be counted as regulatory net
worth) in amounts equal to a percentage of their
operating losses. In return, the institution receives a
promissory note from the FDIC. Although this
transaction seems little more than an exchange of
paper, it has important implications because. it
enables substantially insolvent institutions to con-
tinue in operation and increases the potentialsize of
the FDIC's liability. In return, the FDIC receives
greatercontrol overthe decisions ofthe participants
and avoids the immediate costs associated with
closing the institutions that would otherwise require
receivership outlays. Thus, net worth certificates
make the FDIC an equityholder in the failing insti-
tution, with an overriding vote on certain issues.
Whether these powers are adequate to control risk-
taking, however, remains to be seen.V. TheDeposit Insurance Fund
In the FDIC's supervision of failing institutions
and in its practices for disposing of failed institu-
tions, the agency has not always behaved as. if
preserving the market value of the insurance fund
(or minimizing losses) were the primary objective.
To a certain extent, this may be due to a'*myopic
emphasis on accounting costs-and not on true
economic costs. As a result, the reported value of
the deposit insurance fund may be misleading as an
indicatorofthe FDIC's ability both to manage risk-
taking among depository institutions and to handle
widespread failures.
The deposit insurance fund was valued at $13.8
billion as ofDecember 31, 1982, and represents the
book-value net worth of the FDIC (see Table 3).
Additions to the fund comefrom two sources; insur-
ance premium payments from all insured banks
(which amount to little more than afew basis points
per dollar of deposits but which generate close to
halfofthe FDIC's revenues) and interest income on
the FDIC's $13.6 billion securities portfolio. The
fund is diminished primarily by liquidation expen-
ses, including the FDIC's estimate of its ultimate
losses (net ofrecoveries) in connection with dispos-
ing the"bad" assets offailing institutions.
As mentioned earlier, assets acquired through
insolvency proceedings are generally recorded at
their par values even though they are worth consid-
erably less. At the same time, however, the FDIC
reduces its current income and therefore, the depos-
it insurance fund, by its estimate of the losses in
connection with disposing ofthe failed institution.
Assuming thatthis estimate is valued properly in the
accounting records, the overstatement ofthe value
ofthe FDIC's assets will be offset by the decline in
the FDIC's income and in the value ofthe insurance
fund. However, there is reason to believe that these
estimates may not reflect true economic costs. The
fUle's provision of indemnity agreements and
income maintenance agreements are just two in-
stances in which the FDIC may be placing a lower
value on the transaction than the market does.
Moreover, because the FDIC's choice between a
P&A or an FAM on the one hand, and a payoff on
the other, will frequently depend on its initial esti-
mate oflosses undereach approach, the tendency to
understate the costs ofa P&A (or FAM) will tend to
bias the agency's decisions in favor ofthe P&A (or
FAM) and reduce the value ofthe insurance fund by
more than might have been the case in a payoff.
Likewise, the FDIC's provision ofopen-bank assis-
tance (that is, loans and/or mutual capital certifi-
cates) in return for greater control over the opera-
tions ofthe affected institution amounts to an equity
position in a failing institution. Such an investment
is extremely difficult to value, providing another
source of distortion in the reported value of the
insurance fund.
VI. Summary.and Conclusions
The recent deregulationofdepositrates may have
increased the risks to the deposit insurance fund by
enabling depository institutions to increase their
ability to attract insureddeposits (by offering higher
rates than competitors) and thereby stay inopera-
tion long after their net worth has been exhausted
(on a market value basis). The FDIC shouldaddress
this problem of increased risk by exerting greater
pressure on the chartering agencies to close Insole
vent institutions. Moreover, the agency needs to
engage in more vigorous enforcement of certain
,'safety and soundness" regulations-risk-adjusted
capital adequacy standards, in particular. Ofcourse,
this approach may seem contrary to the spirit of
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financial deregulation. As we have seen, however,
it has a direct counterpart in the largely unregulated
private long-term debt market.
Like deposit insurance, the existence of long-
term debt in a firm's capital structure gives share-
holders incentive to undertake increased risk after
the debt is issued. As a result, long-term debt con-
tracts usually contain covenants to prevent in-
creased risk-taking. These covenants generally
place restrictions on the issuing firm's dividend,
financing and/or investment policies. Violations of
these covenants give the bondholders the right to
renegotiate the terms of the indenture or even to
declare the firm in default and thus force the firm
into bankruptcy.In the same way that restrictive covenants protect
bondholders, regulations regarding loan concentra-
tions, insider transactions and •capital adequacy
standards canprotectthedeposit insurance fund by
constraining .• ba~ks'.. investment •and .financing
choices. And, like bondholders, bank regulators
have substantial. powers to enforce. these regula-
tions, including the authority•to issuecease-and-
desistorders,imposecivil money penalties, remove
bank officers and directors and close insolvent insti-
tutions. However, bank regulators have displayed a
surprising reluctance to resort to these powers. The
FDIC's losses and the subsidy to risk-taking, as a
consequence, .have beetllarger than they would
have been otherwise.
Once insolvent institutions are finally closed, the
choice of liquidation proceedings need not affect
the risk-taking behavior of insured institutions fur-
ther. That choice may, however, affect the losses
incurred by the insurance fund. Because unneces-
sary losses. impose additional costs on society,
minimizing receivershiplosses maybe as important
a social goal as minimizing potentiaUosses prior to
actualfailure.. Because the estimated accounting
costs ofeach ofthe FDIC's liquidationopti6ns may
give a distorted picture ofthetfueeconomic costs,
they may lead the agency to choose an option that
increases receivership losses unnecessarily. More-
over, certainpracticesassociatedwithpurchase and
assumptions, financially assisted mergers and fi-
nancial assistance all make the recorded valueofthe
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